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### 1

#### Our interpretation is the aff has to answer the question of the resolution by engaging the legal system

#### Statutory restrictions mandate legal change

Kershner 2010

(Joshua, Articles Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (June 2011), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, “Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutional” Cardozo Law Review de novo 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 615)

The process by which the President fills an Executive Branch position is governed by the Appointments Clause: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. n81 This process is divided into three phases: (1) Congress creates an Executive Branch position by statute; n82 (2) the President nominates an individual to fill the position; n83 and (3) the Senate confirms the nominee. n84 The Clause covers a specified list of positions and the generic "other Officers of the United States." n85 The Clause controls who nominates, appoints, and confirms an individual for such a position. n86 Finally, the Clause defines a separate process for inferior officers. n87 It should be noted, however, that the Appointments Clause limits but does not empower Congress to create positions. n88 That power comes from the Necessary and Proper Clause. n89 The House of Representatives has no role in the process of nomination and appointment and is specifically not mentioned in the [\*626] Appointments Clause. All of the powers contained in the Appointments Clause are reserved to the President, the Senate, or both. n90 The Appointments Clause makes a distinction between the power to nominate and the separate power to appoint. The power of nomination is textually reserved to the President of the United States, n91 whereas the power of appointment is shared by the President and the Senate. n92 Statutory restrictions violate the plain text of the Appointments Clause because the very act of passing a statute requires the involvement of the House of Representatives. n93 Statutory restrictions on the appointments process are further problematic because the Appointments Clause's power to nominate is vested solely in the President. n94 Those statutory restrictions that limit the President's power to nominate violate the plain text of the Clause. n95 Where the Constitution provides a clear procedural process, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict principles of formalism, construing the text so as to limit, rather than expand, the powers of the various branches of government. n96 The Senate's role in the appointments process is the final confirmation of a nominee. n97 The "advice and consent" of the Senate applies only to the appointment power. n98 The President and the Senate have interpreted advice as non-binding guidance, and have interpreted [\*627] consent as the act of confirmation. n99 Thus, the Appointments Clause gives the Senate only the narrow function of confirming nominees. n100

#### So do judicial restrictions

Singer 2007

(Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force).

#### Prefer our interpretation –

#### A. Limits – there are an infinite number of ways to engage the topic – just winning one of the four parts of the resolution is bad skews the debate too far toward the affirmative – being tied to the stem ensures the negative predictable ground within the literature – that is key to debate

Steinberg & Freeley 2008

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as ~~human~~ beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Legal Education - Debating and topic-preparation enhances student familiarity with legal complexity

Christopher C. Joyner (prof. of International law at Georgetown) Spring 1999 “teaching international law: views from an international relations political scientist” ILSA journal of international & comparative law 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 377

A debate exercise provides students with deeper insights into and appreciation of the complexities of integrating international law into the foreign policy making process. The success of any given debate depends upon the quality of the team members' efforts to research and present a topic, and on their ability to relate concepts and principles of international law to the ways in which foreign policy objectives are formulated and achieved. The exercise is not intended to train international lawyers or to promote forensics as a skill, but rather to give undergraduate political science students a greater sense of the real-world process by which foreign policy is made and implemented, and of the place international legal considerations must be given in that process. In this way, the relevance and reality of international law can be more effectively demonstrated for students of political science in general and of international relations theory in particular.

#### And, you should prioritize practical paths to agency – structural strategy trumps discursive education

David McNally (prof. PoliSci at York University) 1997 *in defense of history: marxism and the postmodern agenda* p. 26-27

We are witnessing today a new idealism, infecting large sections of the intellectual left, which has turned language not merely into an independent realm, but into an all pervasive realm, a sphere so omnipresent, so dominant, as virtually to extinguish human agency. Everything is discourse, you see; and discourse is everything. Because human begins are linguistic creatures, because the world in which we act is a world we know and describe through language, it allegedly follows that there is nothing outside language. Our language, or “discourse,” or “text” – the jargon varies but not the message – defines and limits what we know, what we can imagine, what we can do. There is a political theory here too. Oppression is said to be rooted ultimately in the way in which we and others are defined linguistically, the way in which we are positioned by words in relation to other words, or by codes which are said to be “structured like a language.” Our very being, our identities and “subjectivities,” are constituted through language. As one trendy literary theorist puts it in David Lodge’s novel *Nice Work*, it is not merely that you are what you speak; no, according to the new idealism, “you are what speaks you.” Language is thus the final “prison-house.” Our confinement there is beyond resistance; it is impossible to escape from that which makes us what we are. This new idealism corresponds to a profound collapse of political horizons. It is the pseudoradicalism of a period of retreat for the left, a verbal radicalism of the word without deed, or, rather, of the word *as* deed. In response to actual structures and practices of oppression and exploitation, it offers the rhetorical gesture, the ironic turn of phrase. It comes as little surprise, then, when one of the chief philosophers of the new idealism, Jacques Derrida, tells us that he “would hesitate to use such terms as ‘liberation’” 1 Imprisoned within language, we may play with words; but we can never hope to liberate ourselves from immutable structures of oppression rooted in language, itself. The new idealism and the politics it entails are not simply harmless curiosities; they are an abdication of political responsibility, especially at a time of ferocious capitalist restructuring, of widening gaps between rich and poor, of ruling class offensives against social programs. They are also an obstacle to the rebuilding of mass ~~movements~~ of protest and resistance.

### 2

#### Racism is structured by neoliberal capitalism - society is has become indifferent to color yet at the same time the capitalism makes it so that racial bias is viewed economically – the system is structured to coopt public attempts to challenge racial distribution

Giroux, 2003 (Henry, Waterbury Chair Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at Pennsylvania State University, “Spectacles of Race and Pedagogies of Denial: Anti-Black Racist Pedagogy Under the Reign of Neoliberalism”, Communication Education, Vol. 52, No. 3/4, July/October)

When Du Bois wrote the Souls of Black Folk, racism was a visible and endemic part of the American political, cultural, and economic landscape. The racial divide was impossible to ignore, irrespective of one’s politics. As we move into the new millennium, the politics of the color line and representations of race have become far more subtle and complicated than they were in the Jim Crow era when Du Bois made his famous pronouncement. And though far from invisible, the complicated nature of race relations in American society no longer appears to be marked by the specter of Jim Crow. A majority of Americans now believe that antiblack racism is a thing of the past, since it is assumed that formal institutions of segregation no longer exist. At the same time, surveys done by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago have consistently found “that most Americans still believe blacks are less intelligent than whites, lazier than whites, and more likely than whites to prefer living on welfare over being self-supporting” (Cited in Shipler, 1998, p. 59). Contradictions aside, conservatives and liberals alike now view America’s racial hierarchy as an unfortunate historical fact that now has no bearing on contemporary society. Pointing to the destruction of the Southern caste system, the problematizing of whiteness as a racial category, the passing of civil rights laws, a number of successful lawsuits alleging racial discrimination against companies such as Texaco and Denny’s, and the emergence of people of color into all aspects of public life, the color line now seems in disarray, a remnant of another era that Americans have fortunately moved beyond. Best selling books such as Dinesh D’Souza’s The End of Racism (1995), Jim Sleeper’s Liberal Racism (2002), and Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom’s America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible (1999) all proclaim racism as an obsolete ideology and practice. And a large number of White Americans seem to agree. In fact, poll after poll reveals that a majority of White Americans believe that people of color no longer face racial discrimination in American life. For example, a recent Gallop Survey on “Black––White Relations” observes that 7 out of 10 whites believe that blacks are treated equally in their communities … . Eight in ten whites say blacks receive equal educational opportunities, and 83% say blacks receive equal housing opportunities in their communities. Only a third of whites believe blacks face race racial bias from police in their areas (Wise, 2002).2 For many conservative and liberal intellectuals, the only remaining remnant of racist categorization and policy in an otherwise color-blind society is affirmative action, which, ironically, it is alleged provides Blacks with an unfair advantage in higher education, the labor force, “entitlement programs,” and “even summer scholarship programs” (Winter, 2003, A15).3 The importance of race and the enduring fact of racism are relegated to the dustbin of history at a time in American life when the discourses of race and the spectacle of racial representations saturate the dominant media and public life. The color line is now mined for exotic commodities that can be sold to White youth in the form of rap music, hip-hop clothing, and sports gear. African American celebrities such as Michael Jordan, Etta James, and George Foreman are used to give market legitimacy to everything from clothes to high-end luxury cars to gas grills. Black public intellectuals such as Patricia Williams, Cornel West, Michael Dyson, and Henry Louis Gates command the attention of The New York Times and other eye-catching media. African Americans now occupy powerful positions on the Supreme Court and the highest levels of political life. The alleged collapse, if not transformation, of the color line can also be seen in the emergence of the Black elite, prominently on display in television sitcoms, fashion magazines, Hollywood movies, and music videos. On the political scene, however, the supposedly race-transcendent public policy is complicated by ongoing public debates over affirmative action, welfare, crime, and the prison-industrial complex. All of which is to suggest that while the color line has been modified and dismantled in places, race and racial hierarchies still exercise a profound influence on how most people in the United States experience their daily lives (Goldberg, 2002; Marable, 2002; Martinot, 2003; Winant, 2001). Popular sentiment aside, rather than disappearing, race has not lost its power as a key signifier in structuring all aspects of American life. As Michael Omi (1996) keenly observes: “Despite legal guarantees of formal equality and access, race continues to be a fundamental organizing principle of individual identity and collective action. I would argue that, far from declining in significance … the racial dimensions of politics and culture have proliferated” (Omi, 1996, p. 183). Representations of race and difference are everywhere in American society, and yet racism as both a symbol and condition of American life is either ignored or relegated to an utterly privatized discourse, typified in references to individual prejudices, or psychological dispositions such as expressions of “hate.” As politics becomes more racialized, the discourse about race becomes more privatized. While the realities of race permeate public life, they are engaged less as discourses and sites where differences are produced within iniquitous relations of power than as either unobjectionable cultural signifiers or desirable commodities. The public morality of the marketplace works its magic in widening the gap between political control and economic power while simultaneously reducing political agency to the act of consuming. One result is a growing cynicism and powerlessness among the general population as the political impotence of public institutions is reinforced through the disparaging of any reference to ethics, equity, justice, or any other normative referent that prioritizes democratic values over market considerations. Similarly, as corporate power undermines all notions of the public good and increasingly privatizes public space, it obliterates those public spheres where criticism might emerge that acknowledges the tensions wrought by a pervasive racism that “functions as one of the deep, abiding currents in everyday life, in both the simplest and the most complex interactions of whites and blacks” (Geiger, 1997, p. 27). Indifference and cynicism breed contempt and resentment as racial hierarchies now collapse into power-evasive strategies such as blaming minorities of class and color for not working hard enough, or exercising individual initiative, or practicing reverse racism. Marketplace ideologies now work to erase the social from the language of public life so as to reduce all racial problems to private issues such as individual character.

#### The affirmative’s attempt to proliferate black knowledge production will be incorporated into the system and sold as a new market for capital’s infiltration. Their framing certainly does not resist capitalism commodification. Despite the best intentions, Difference and identity can and must only be understood from a class-based perspective. This is key to creating a successful movement capable of catalyzing ethical demands at the global level

D’Annibale and McLaren 2004(Valerie Catamburio, PhD, chairs the Graduate Program in Communication and Social Justice at the University of Windsor, and Peter, professor in the Division of Urban Schooling, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, UCLA, “The Strategic Centrality of Class in the Politics of "Race" and "Difference”,” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 148-175 (2003))

Because post-al theories of difference often circumvent the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of difference from analyses¶ of class formation and capitalist social relations, we contend that it is necessary¶ to (re)conceptualize difference by drawing on Marx’s materialist and historical¶ formulations. Difference needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. Because systems of difference almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference¶ that exist in specific contexts. Drawing on the Marxist concept of mediation¶ enables us to unsettle the categorical (and sometimes overly rigid) approaches¶ to both class and difference for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies at the heart of our politics—that it was absurd to choose¶ between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization,¶personal or collective will, and historical or structural determination. In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see “difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics”¶ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji has pointed to the need to historicize difference in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class¶ (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies) and to acknowledge the¶ changing configurations of difference and “otherness.” Apprehending the¶ meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the¶ importance of exploring (a) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (b) the meanings and connotations that are attached to categories of difference; (c) how differences are produced out of, and lived within, specific his torical, social, and political formations; and (d) the production of difference in¶ relation to the complexities, contradictions, and exploitative relations of¶ capitalism.¶ Moreover, it presents a challenge to “identitarian” understandings of difference based almost exclusively on questions of cultural and/or racial hegemony.¶In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater¶ cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). Much of what is called the “politics of difference” is little more than a¶ demand for an end to monocultural quarantine and for inclusion into the metropolitan salons of bourgeois representation—a posture that reinscribes a¶ neoliberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free market capitalism. In¶ short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace, and freedom¶ amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their different “cultural” goods.¶A paradigmatic expression of this position is encapsulated in the following passage that champions a form of difference politics whose presumed aim¶ is to make social groups appear. Minority and immigrant ethnic groups have laid¶ claim to the street as a legitimate forum for the promotion and exhibition of traditional dress, food, and culture....[This] is a politics of visibility and invisibility. Because it must deal with a tradition of representation that insists on subsuming varied social practices to a standard norm, its struggle is as much on the¶ page, screen . . . as it is at the barricade and in the parliament, traditional¶ forums of political intervention before the postmodern. (Fuery& Mansfield,¶2000, p. 150)¶ This position fosters a “fetishized” understanding of difference in terms of primordial and seemingly autonomous cultural identities and treats such “differences” as inherent, as ontologically secure cultural traits of the individuals of¶ particular cultural communities. Rather than exploring the construction of¶ difference within specific contexts mediated by the conjunctural¶ embeddedness of power differentials, we are instead presented with an overflowing cornucopia of cultural particularities that serve as markers of ethnicity,¶ race, group boundaries, and so forth. In this instance, the discourse of difference operates ideologically—cultural recognition derived from the rhetoric of¶ tolerance averts our gaze from relations of production and presents a strategy¶ for attending to difference as solely an ethnic, racial, or cultural issue.¶What advocates of such an approach fail to acknowledge is that the forces of¶ diversity and difference are allowed to flourish provided that they remain¶ within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism¶ of difference politics cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of¶ ideas and cultural practices. In fact, the post-al themes of identity, difference,¶ diversity, and the like mesh quite nicely with contemporary corporate interests¶ precisely because they revere lifestyle—the quest for, and the cultivation of, the¶ self—and often encourage the fetishization of identities in the marketplace as they compete for “visibility” (Boggs, 2000; Field, 1997). Moreover, the¶ uncritical, celebratory tone of various forms of difference politics can also¶ lead to some disturbing conclusions. For example, if we take to their logical¶ conclusion the statements that “postmodern political activism fiercely contests¶ the reduction of the other to the same,” that post-al narratives believe that “difference needs to be recognized and respected at all levels” (Fuery& Mansfield,¶2000, p. 148), and that the recognition of different subject positions is paramount (Mouffe, 1988, pp. 35-36), their political folly becomes clear. Eagleton¶ (1996) sardonically commented on the implications:¶Almost all postmodern theorists would seem to imagine that difference, variability and heterogeneity are “absolute” goods, and it is a position I have long held¶ myself. It has always struck me as unduly impoverishing of British social life that¶ we can muster a mere two or three fascist parties. . . . The opinion that plurality is¶ a good in itself is emptily formalistic and alarmingly unhistorical. (pp. 126-127)¶ The liberal pluralism manifest in discourses of difference politics often means a¶ plurality without conflict, contestation, or contradiction. The inherent limitations of this position are also evident if we turn our attention to issues of class.¶Expanding on Eagleton’s observations and adopting the logic that seems to¶ inform the unqualified celebration of difference, one would be compelled to¶ champion class differences as well. Presumably, the differences between the¶ 475 billionaires whose combined wealth now equals the combined yearly¶ incomes of more than 50% of the world’s population are to be celebrated—a¶ posturing that would undoubtedly lend itself to a triumphant endorsement of¶ capitalism and inequitable and exploitative conditions. San Juan (1995) noted¶ that the cardinal flaw in current instantiations of culturalism lies in its decapitation of discourses of intelligibility from the politics of antagonistic relations.¶He framed the question quite pointedly: “In a society stratified by uneven¶ property relations, by asymmetrical allocation of resources and of power, can¶ there be equality of cultures and genuine toleration of differences?” (pp. 232-¶ 233).

#### The performance of the 1AC only serves to prop up capitalism – modern day capitalism is fueled by an emphasis on difference and counter-culture

Frank 97 [Thomas Frank, Johnny Can’t Dissent: Commodify your dissent, copyright 1997]

The patron saints of the countercultural idea are, of course, the Beats, whose frenzied style and merry alienation still maintain a powerful grip on the American imagination. Even forty years after the publication of On the Road, the works of Kerouac, Ginsberg, and Burroughs remain the sine qua non of dissidence, the model for aspiring poets, rock stars, or indeed anyone who feels vaguely artistic or alienated. That frenzied sensibility of pure experience, life on the edge, immediate gratification, and total freedom from moral restraint, which the Beats first propounded back in those heady days when suddenly everyone could have their own TV and powerful V-8, has stuck with us through all the intervening years and become something of a permanent American style. Go to any poetry reading and you can see a string of junior Kerouacs go through the routine, upsetting cultural hierarchies by pushing themselves to the limit, straining for that gorgeous moment of original vice when Allen Ginsberg first read "Howl" in 1955 and the patriarchs of our fantasies recoiled in shock. The Gap may have since claimed Ginsberg and USA Today may run feature stories about the brilliance of the beloved Kerouac, but the rebel race continues today regardless, with ever-heightening shit-references calculated to scare Jesse Helms, talk about sex and smack that is supposed to bring the electricity of real life, and ever-more determined defiance of the repressive rules and mores of the American 1950s--rules and mores that by now we know only from movies. But one hardly has to go to a poetry reading to see the countercultural idea acted out. Its frenzied ecstasies have long since become an official aesthetic of consumer society, a monotheme of mass as well as adversarial culture. Turn on the TV and there it is instantly: the unending drama of consumer unbound and in search of an ever-heightened good time, the inescapable rock `n' roll soundtrack, dreadlocks and ponytails bounding into Taco Bells, a drunken, swinging-camera epiphany of tennis shoes, outlaw soda pops, and mind-bending dandruff shampoos. Corporate America, it turns out, no longer speaks in the voice of oppressive order that it did when Ginsberg moaned in 1956 that Time magazine was always telling me about responsibility. Business- men are serious. Movie producers are serious. Everybody's serious but me. Nobody wants you to think they're serious today, least of all Time Warner. On the contrary: the Culture Trust is now our leader in the Ginsbergian search for kicks upon kicks. Corporate America is not an oppressor but a sponsor of fun, provider of lifestyle accoutrements, facilitator of carnival, our slang-speaking partner in the quest for that ever-more apocalyptic orgasm. The countercultural idea has become capitalist orthodoxy, its hunger for transgression upon transgression now perfectly suited to an economic-cultural regime that runs on ever-faster cyclings of the new; its taste for self-fulfillment and its intolerance for the confines of tradition now permitting vast latitude in consuming practices and lifestyle experimentation. Consumerism is no longer about "conformity" but about "difference." Advertising teaches us not in the ways of puritanical self-denial (a bizarre notion on the face of it), but in orgiastic, never-ending self-fulfillment. It counsels not rigid adherence to the tastes of the herd but vigilant and constantly updated individualism. We consume not to fit in, but to prove, on the surface at least, that we are rock `n' roll rebels, each one of us as rule-breaking and hierarchy-defying as our heroes of the 60s, who now pitch cars, shoes, and beer. This imperative of endless difference is today the genius at the heart of American capitalism, an eternal fleeing from "sameness" that satiates our thirst for the New with such achievements of civilization as the infinite brands of identical cola, the myriad colors and irrepressible variety of the cigarette rack at 7-Eleven.

#### Our ethico-political obligation is to assume responsibility for our actions. Capitalism render’s its victims anonymous and ensures that the aff’s personal focus never come to terms with the billions of degraded life choices globally

Slavoj Zizek and Glyn Daly, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, 2004, Conversations With Zizek, p. 14-16

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gord­ian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subju­gated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture — with all its pieties con­cerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette — Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political mor­bidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of im­plicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibi­tion conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight thatin order to create a uni­versal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its constructionthrough a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is thatthe gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its out­comes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diver­sity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and name­less (viz, the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’. And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is mag­nified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differ­ential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sus­tained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against thisZizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-par­ticular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### Modern capitalism ensures that Differentiations exist between the ontological *worlds* of identity politics. These differentiations are central to violence and extermination and necessitate unending war. The alternatives presupposition of ethical equality is a prerequisite to dealing with zones of sacrifice like debate

Balibar, 2001 (Etienne, Emeritus Prof. of Philosophy @ U. of Paris X Nanterre and U. of Cal., Irvine, “Outlines of a Topography of Cruelty: Citizenship and Civility in the Era of Global Violence,” Constellations, Vol. 8.1)

this paper is based on a talk which I was asked to deliver in November 1999 for the opening of the Graduate Course in Humanitarian Action at the University of Geneva.2 This will explain why the issues of citizenship and segregation, asylum and migration, mass poverty and genocides in the globalized world order will play a central role in this discussion. These are to me the crucial “cosmopo- litical” issues which we should try to locate and connect if we want to understand how and why democratic citizenship in today’s world cannot be separated from an invention of concrete forms and strategies of civility.¶I shall focus on two sets of problems. The first is typically European. I am thinking of the negative counterpart of the post-national integration and introduc- tion of “European Citizenship,” which is not only a revival of so-called “commu- nitarian” demands and “identity politics,” but above all a development of quasi-Apartheid social structures and institutions. This forms a contradictory pattern, which in many respects is now becoming highly unstable. The second set of problems is global: it appears as a systematic use of various forms of extreme violence and mass insecurity to prevent collective movements of emancipation that aim at transforming the structures of domination. For this reason – and also with the pattern of state-construction that Thomas Hobbes once described in the Leviathan as preventive counter-violence in mind – I shall not hesitate to speak of a politics of global preventive counter-revolution or counter-insurrection. But from another angle this “politics” is really anti-political, since in a nihilistic way it leads to suppressing the very conditions of building a polity. Instead, we witness the joint development of various sorts of wars and a kind of “humanitarian” action or intervention, which in many cases becomes an instrument in the service of precisely those powers who created the distress. Not by chance, in these two sets of problems the traditional institution of borders, which I think can be defined in the modern era as a “sovereign” or non-democratic condition of democracy itself, mainly works as an instrument of security controls, social segregation, and unequal access to the means of existence, and sometimes as an institutional distri- bution of survival and death: it becomes a cornerstone of institutional violence. This explains in advance why I shall insist on the democratization of borders, not only as their opening (and perhaps least of all as their generalized abolition, which in many cases would simply lead to a renewed war of all against all in the form of wild competition among economic forces), but above all as a multilateral, negotiated control of their working by the populations themselves (including, of course, migrant populations). Perhaps new representative institutions should be set up in this regard which are not merely “territorial” and certainly not purely national. This is part of what I would call a “cosmopolitics of human rights,” where citizenship and civility are closely associated.¶Before giving more detail about the two sets of concrete problems I want to deal with here, I think that we need some philosophical instruments to place them in the broader perspective of a reflection on the relationship between human rights and politics. It is widely accepted – and I share this view to a large extent – that here Hannah Arendt’s work provides a necessary starting point. Allow me a few considerations on what we can draw from her. In her discussion of imperialism in The Origins of Totalitarianism she addresses the question of “stateless” popula- tions, deprived of any civil and civic rights, which had been immensely increased in Europe (and elsewhere) after the two world wars.3 In so doing, she inverts the perspective of political philosophy in a double manner.¶First, she reinstalls – right in the middle of debates about citizenship and polit- ical regimes – forms of exclusion and situations of extreme violence where the survival of humans, as mere representatives of the species, is threatened. She did not want only to assert a humanistic criterion with a view to doing justice, but to show that it is only through the discovery of a solution for such situations that we can find a new foundation for the public sphere, where collective political action (or praxis) takes place, and not only the management of population movements and policing of social conflicts. In a very similar way, the French philosopher Jacques Rancière more recently argued that, since the very origins of democracy, the measure of equal liberty for all in the political realm was based on “la part des sans part,” i.e., giving a fair share to those who hold no share in the common- wealth, or the political recognition of the have-nots. In other words, this would mean an active transformation of exclusion processes into processes of inclusion of the discriminated categories into the “city” or the “polity.”4 This is exactly what isonomia in Greek cities was about. In this respect, “politics” in the strong sense becomes inseparable from “permanent revolution,” a notion that Hannah Arendt might have inherited from Rosa Luxemburg.¶From this perspective, the juridical form of equal liberty is clearly not elimi- nated. But it has to be reworked completely. With respect to the principles of modern humanism-universalism, a notion of “persons without rights” is a contra- diction in terms, since de jure nobody is without rights, not even children or the handicapped. But if we view positively, for instance, such claims as those of prop- ertyless peasants in Brazil, whose motto is “justice for the rightless” when they demand that paramilitary forces who kill and terrorize the poor be tried and condemned, or those of migrant workers in France who protest against their being denied official documents by asking for a “droit de cité pour les sans papiers” (legal residence for the undocumented), we can view these demands based on resistance and the refusal of violence as partial but direct expressions of the process of the creation of rights, a dynamic which allows the political constitution to become recognized as “popular sovereignty” or democracy.¶ This is one aspect of the lessons we can draw from Arendt’s reflections on citi- zenship, but there is another which in a sense is even more relevant today. I am thinking of the famous argument showing that the history of nation-states has produced a reversal of the traditional relationship between “human rights” and “political rights” (or droits de l’homme and droits du citoyen) since they evolved from the originary democratic national revolutions to the generalization of inter- national conflicts and the development of imperialism. Human rights in general can no longer be considered a mere prerequisite and an abstract foundation for political rights that are set up and preserved within the limits of a given national and sovereign state, but neither can they be considered to set a limit to the domi- nation of the political over the juridical; it has become the opposite, as the tragic experiences of imperialism and totalitarianism in the twentieth century made manifest. We discovered that political rights, the actual granting and conditions of equal citizenship, were the true basis for a recognition and definition of “human rights” – to begin with, the most elementary ones concerning survival, naked life. Giving a new, “unpolitical” meaning to the zôonpolitikon itself, those who were not citizens of some state, who were “citizens of nowhere in the world,” were no longer practically recognized and treated as humans. When the positive institu- tional rights of the citizen are destroyed – e.g., when, in a given historical context where citizenship and nationhood are closely associated, individuals and groups are chased out of their national belonging or simply put in the situation of an oppressed national “minority” – the basic rights which are supposed to be “natural” or “universally human” are threatened and destroyed: we witness forms of extreme violence, creating a distinction between so-called Untermenschen (subhumans) and “humans” believed to be supermen, Übermenschen. This is by no means a contingent phenomenon; it results from an irreversible process that has become common in contemporary politics. It imposes upon democracy the immediate task of a renewed foundation. The very essence of politics is at stake, since politics is not a mere “superstructure” above the social and natural condi- tions of life, communication, and culture. The true concept of politics already concerns the very possibility of a community among humans, establishing a space for encounter, for the expression and dialectical resolution of antagonisms among its various constitutive parts and groups.¶Seen from this angle, the crucial notion suggested by Arendt, that of a “right to have rights,” does not feature a minimal remainder of the political, made of juridi- cal and moral claims to be protected by a constitution; it is much more the idea of a maximum. Or, better said, it refers to the continuous process in which a minimal recognition of the belonging of human beings to the “common” sphere of exis- tence (and therefore also of work, culture, public and private speech, etc.) already involves a totality of rights, and makes it possible. I call this the “insurrectional” element of democracy, which predetermines every constitution of a democratic or republican state. Such a state, by definition, cannot consist (or cannot only consist) of statuses and rights ascribed from above; it requires the direct partici- pation of the demos. I should say that Arendt’s argument clearly recognizes the importance of the egalitarian or insurrectional element constitutive of democratic citizenship, but there is more: what she displays is the dialectical relationship of this element and the politics of civility. This comes from the fact that the radically excluded, those who, being denied citizenship, are also automatically denied the material conditions of life and the recognition of their human dignity, do not provide only a theoretical criterion to evaluate historical institutions against the model of the ideal constitution. They also force us to address the reality of extreme violence in contemporary political societies – nay, in the very heart of their everyday life. This is only a seeming paradox: the limit or the “state of exception” (Schmitt) is noth- ing exceptional. On the contrary, it is “banal”; it permeates the functioning of social and political systems which claim or believe themselves to be “democra- tic.” It is both an instrument for the continuity of their vested interests in power, and a permanent threat to their vitality. This is why we should not consider the choice between access to and denial of the rights of citizenship – more generally, the possibility and impossibility of an inclusive political order – as a speculative issue. It is a concrete challenge. The (democratic) political order is intrinsically fragile or precarious; if not continuously recreated in a politics of civility, it becomes again a “state of war,” within or across borders.¶We know that Arendt’s argument was based on the experience of a “catastrophe” in European history: Nazism, World War Two, and the racist extermination of European Jews, Gypsies, and other groups. She tried to trace back its “origins” in the evolution of the nation-form towards imperialism, while at the same time carefully remaining aware of its uniqueness. We might summarize her idea by speaking of a deadly circle in which the national constitution of the state had trapped us. The nation-state was at the same time the sole positive or institutional horizon for the recognition of human rights and an “impossible” one, producing the destruction of the universal values it had supported. Now we must ask ourselves whether we are still living and acting in the same conditions. If not, we should ask what the claim of “a right to have rights” could become in today’s politics. This question becomes a burning one when we observe that, although the nation-form has not simply been withering away, the conditions of politics, the economy, and culture, the material distribution of power and the possibilities of controlling it, have become increasingly transnational. “Post- national” state or quasi-state institutions have emerged in the general framework of globalization. The “European Community” is a privileged case of these develop- ments. Let us first reflect on some of the contradictory and worrying aspects of this process, which, seen from another side, holds much promise.¶I take it to be a crucial issue to acknowledge that, along with the development of a formal “European citizenship,” a real “European Apartheid” has emerged. In the long or even the short run, it could obstruct or block the construction of a democra- tic European community. It could therefore block European construction altogether, since there is no real possibility of the supranational community being achieved in an authoritarian way, à la Bismarck, even for the sake of accumulating power or creating a regional power which would be able to match the world’s economic, political, and military superpower. A supranational European community will exist only if, compared with existing national constitutions, it means a democratic surplus for the majority. Let me clarify the issue by asking two symmetrical ques- tions: Why speak of a European Apartheid? Why speak of Apartheid in Europe?¶Why speak of a European “Apartheid”? This cannot be simply the case because foreigners are granted lesser rights (more precisely: some categories of foreigners, mainly immigrant workers and asylum seekers from the East and the South who legally or illegally crossed the frontiers protecting the wealthy “civilization” of Europe, the Balkan region featuring in this respect a kind of combination of both extraneities). There must be something qualitatively new. This is indeed the case with the new developments of the construction of Europe since the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht. In each and every one of the European nation-states, there exist structures of discrimination which command uneven access to citizenship or nationality, particularly those inherited from the colonial past. But the additional fact with the birth of the European Union (coming after a mere European Economic Community) is that a concept of CivisEuropeanus progressively acquires a specific content: new individual and collective rights, which progres- sively become effective (e.g., possibilities to appeal to European Courts against one’s own national administration and system of justice).¶Now the crucial question becomes: new rights for whom? It could be, abstractly speaking, either for the whole population of Europe, or simply for a more limited European people (I am expanding here the dilemma which is now taking place in Germany about the distinction between Volk and Bevölkerung, since this dilemma actually concerns all of Europe and the German controversy is paradigmatic). It proves very difficult and embarrassing to “define” the Euro- pean people as the symbolic, legal, and material basis for the European constituency. Maastricht solved the problem by simply stating that those and only those who already possess citizenship (i.e., are nationals) in one of the constituent national states will automatically be granted European citizenship. But this – which may remind us of debates among the Founding Fathers of the US Consti- tution – already determines an orientation. Given the quantitative and qualitative importance of the immigrant population permanently residing in Europe (what French political scientist Catherine de Wenden has called “the sixteenth member- state”5), it immediately transforms a project of inclusion into a program of exclu- sion which could be summarized by three metamorphoses:¶• from foreigners to aliens (meaning second-class residents who are deemed to be of a different kind);¶ • from protection to discrimination (this is a very sensitive issue, as shown by the Austrian case, but again, with some differences in degree and language, it is a general European problem: since some of the immigrant workers who are deprived of political citizenship enjoy some social rights, i.e., are included in “social citizenship,” it becomes a crucial political issue and an obsession for conservative forces to have them expelled from welfare, social protection, etc. – what the French National Front has called préférencenationale, but precisely because a degree of préférence already exists in the national institutions, it is likely to become a préférenceeuropéenne); and finally,¶ • from cultural difference to racial stigmatization, which is the heart of the creation of the “new racism,” postcolonial and post-national. Why suggest a parallel with South African “Apartheid”? This could only be a useless provocation. . . Should we really suggest that, while Apartheid has offi- cially disappeared in Africa, it is now reappearing in Europe (and perhaps also elsewhere) – a further development in the process of “the Empire striking back” (Paul Gilroy)? We could think of comparisons with other historical cases of insti- tutional racism, for example the US, which we know has never completely forgot- ten the Jim Crow system, and periodically seems to be on the way to recreating it when conservative policy is on the agenda. . . For his part, my German colleague Helmut Dietrich, who has long worked on refugees and migrants on the “Eastern Border” of Europe, particularly the Balkans, spoke of the Hinterland of the new European Reich, etc.¶ Leaving aside the question of how to measure the amount of suffering created by one or another system and focusing instead on the structures, I suggest two complementary reasons at least to borrow lessons from the historical example of Apartheid, i.e., to compare the situation of the regions whence most of the migrants come, in Africa, Asia, or other parts of Europe, with homelands in the South African sense. One is that the position of the important group of workers who “reproduce” their lives on one side of the border and “produce” on the other side, and thus more precisely are neither insiders nor outsiders, or (for many of us) are insiders officially considered outsiders, produces a steady increase in the amount and the violence of “security” controls, which spread everywhere in the society and ramify the borderline throughout the “European” territory, combining modern techniques of identification and recording with good old “racial profil- ing” (contrôle au faciès). This in particular is what the Schengen agreement was about. The second complementary reason is that the existence of migrant families (and their composition, their way of life) has become a true obsession for migra- tion policies and public opinion. Should the alien families be separated or united (that is, reunited)? If so, on which side of the border, which kind of families (traditional, modern), which kind of relatives (parents, children), with what kind of rights, etc.? As I have argued elsewhere, the interference of family politics, more generally a politics of genealogy, with the definition of the national “community” is a crucial structural mode of production of historical racism.6 Of course, this is also true when the national becomes multinational community.¶From all this we might draw the conclusion that a de-segregated Europe, i.e., a democratic Europe, is far from the agenda. Indeed, the situation is much more contradictory, since tendencies point in both directions; we are in the middle of a historical crossroad that is, only partially and reluctantly acknowledged. But I prefer to insist on another idea, which provides me with the necessary transition to the next point, namely the fact that these issues typically illustrate a global-local (“glocal”) problem. The contradictory and evolutionary pattern of “European citi- zenship-cum-Apartheid” (or statutory, ascriptive citizenship) (Rogers Smith) in a sense is a reaction to real and imaginary effects of globalization. In another sense it is a mere projection, albeit with historical specificities, of such effects. I shall now directly address the main issue that I announced, that of the “global counter-insurrection”: not the violence of the border, but the violence without borders or beyond borders.¶Allow me to quote from a recent study of humanitarian action, published by a Swiss expert, Pierre de Senarclens of the University of Lausanne, who rightly insists on the importance of official definitions of contemporary violence and also on the problematic aspects of the justifications they provide for an extension of the scope and meaning of “humanitarian interventions”:¶ In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution dedicated to a New International Humanitarian Order. . . . Shortly thereafter, the Assembly gave its support to the creation of an independent commission on international humani- tarian questions, which brought together eminent people. . . . The Commission’s 1986 report placed within the humanitarian project the principal political and social challenges of the age, such as environmental degradation, demographic transition, population movements, human rights violations, weapons of mass destruction, North-South polarization, terrorism, and drugs.7¶ He concludes: “We consider humanitarianism as a frame of reference for the iden- tification of important contemporary problems and a formula for their solution.” Later the author shows how, after 1989, the collapse of the Cold War system of “two camps” suppressed the limits which the confrontation between the super- powers had set to political violence, and blurred the borderlines between “war” and “peace”:¶No one foresaw the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the prelude to the swift end of the Cold War. Nor did anyone anticipate the transformations in international struc- tures and the violence that followed. Toward the mid-1990s, we count more than fifty new armed conflicts, essentially civil wars. Certain of these conflicts – in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Chechnia, or Algeria – astonish by their violence and cruelty, by the extent of the destruction and the population movements they provoke. Inter- national society has never been confronted with so many wars making so many victims in such a short time.8¶ In such conditions, we can incline towards diverging conclusions. Either we think that the multifaceted phenomenon of mass violence and extreme violence has generally replaced politics, including internal and external relationships of forces among states, or we fully take into account the fact that the fields of poli- tics and violence – a violence that seems to lack rational organization, not except- ing self-destruction – are no longer separated; they have progressively permeated one another. It is precisely in such conditions that something called “humanitar- ian action” or “intervention,” both “private” and “public,” has become the neces- sary supplement of politics. I cannot discuss all the aspects of this mutation, but I would like briefly to address three questions which seem to me to have an importance for the concept of politics itself. 1. Are we facing an “unprecedented” spread of extreme violence (or violence of the extremes)?¶I should like to be very careful on this point, which raises a number of discussions ranging from the issue of “old and new wars”9 to the highly sensitive moral ques- tions of why and how to “compare genocides” in history. Perhaps what is unprecedented is basically the new visibility of extreme violence, particularly in the sense that modern techniques of media coverage and broadcasting and the transformation of images – in the end, as we could see for the first time on a grand scale during the Gulf War, of the production of “virtual reality” – transform extreme violence into a show, and display this show simultaneously before a world audience. We also know that the effect of such techniques is, at the same time, to uncover some violent processes, or scenes of horror (truly horrifying, such as hundreds of mutilated children in Angola or Sierra Leone), and to cover up others (equally horrifying, such as babies starving in Baghdad). We suspect that powerful ideological biases are at work when the coverage of extreme violence gives credit to such simple ideas as the political transition from the “equilibrium of terror” during the Cold War to the “competition among victims” through the undifferentiated uses of the legal and moral but hardly political notion of “crimes against humanity.” In the end, we become aware of the fact that talk- ing about and showing the images of everyday horror produces, particularly in the relatively wealthy and protected regions of humanity, a very ambivalent effect: raising compassion but also disgust, reinforcing the idea that humankind as such is really divided into qualitatively different cultures or civilizations, which, according to one political scientist, can only lead to a “clash” among them.¶I am aware of all these difficulties, but I would maintain that a reality lies behind the notion of something “unprecedented.” Perhaps it is simply the fact that a number of heterogeneous methods or processes of extermination (by which I mean eliminating masses of individuals inasmuch as they belong to objective or subjective groups) have themselves become “globalized,” i.e., operate in a simi- lar manner everywhere in the world at the same time, and so progressively form a “chain,” giving full reality to what E.P. Thompson anticipated 20 years ago with the name “exterminism.”10 In this series of connected processes, we must include, precisely because they are heterogeneous – they do not have one and the same “cause,” but they produce cumulative effects:¶• wars (both “civil” and “foreign,” a distinction which is not easy to draw in many cases – think of Yugoslavia or Chechnya);¶ • communal rioting, with ethnic and/or religious ideologies of “cleansing”;¶ • famines and other kinds of “absolute” poverty produced by the ruin of tradi-¶ tional or non-traditional economies;¶ • seemingly “natural” catastrophes which in fact are killing on a mass scale¶ because they are overdetermined by social, economic, and political structures, such as pandemics (think of the difference in the distribution of AIDS and the possibilities of treatment between Europe and Northern America on one side, and Africa and some parts of Asia on the other), draught, floods, or earthquakes in the absence of developed civil protection. . .¶ In the end it would be my suggestion that the “gobalization” of various kinds of extreme violence has produced a tendential division of the “globalized” world into life-zones and death-zones. Between these zones (which indeed are intricate, frequently reproduced within the boundaries of a single country or city) there exists a decisive and fragile superborder, which raises fears and concerns about the unity and division of mankind – something like a global and local “enmity line,” like the “amity line” which existed in the beginning of the modern Euro- pean seizure of the world.11 It is this superborder, this enmity line, that becomes at the same time an object of permanent show and a hot place for intervention. But also for nonintervention. We might consider whether the most worrying aspect of present international politics is “humanitarian intervention” or “gener- alized non-intervention,” or one coming after the other. . .¶ 2. Should we consider that extreme violence is “rational” or “functional” from the point of view of market capitalism (“liberal economics”)?¶This is a very difficult question – in fact, I think it is the most difficult question – but it cannot be avoided. Again, we should warn against a paralogism that is only too obvious but nonetheless frequent: that of mistaking consequences for goals or purposes. (But is it really possible to discuss social systems in terms of purposes? On the other hand, can we avoid reflecting on the immanent ends of a given structure, such as capitalism, or its “logic”?) It seems to me, very schematically, that the difficulty arises from the two opposite “global effects” which derive from the emergence of a chain of mass violence – as compared, for example, with what Marx called primitive accumulation when he described the creation of the preconditions for capitalist accumulation in terms of violent suppression of the poor.¶One kind of effect is simply to generalize material and moral insecurity for millions of potential workers, i.e., to induce a massive proletarianization or repro- letarianization (a new phase of proletarianization which crucially involves a return of many to the proletarian condition which they had more or less escaped, given that insecurity is precisely the heart of the “proletarian condition”). This process is contemporary with an increased mobility of capital and also humans, and so it takes place across borders. But, seen historically, it can also be distrib- uted among several political varieties:¶• in the “North,” it involves a partial or deep dismantling of the social policies and the institutions of social citizenship created by the welfare state, what I call the “national social state,” and therefore also a violent transition from welfare to workfare, from the social state to the penal state (the US showing the way in this respect, as has been convincingly argued by Loïc Wacquant12);¶ • in the “South,” it involves destroying and inverting the “developmental” programs and policies, which admittedly did not suffice to produce “take-off,” but indicated a way to resist impoverishment;¶ • in the “semi-periphery,” to borrow Wallerstein’s category, it was connected with the collapse of the dictatorial structure called “real existing socialism,” which was based on scarcity and corruption, but again kept the polarization of riches and poverty within certain limits.¶ Let me suggest that a common formal feature of all these processes that result in the reproletarianization of the labor-force is the fact that they suppress or mini- mize the forms and possibilities of representation of the subaltern within the state apparatus itself, or, if you prefer, the possibilities of more or less effective counter-power. With this remark I want to emphasize the political aspect of processes which, in the first instance, seem to be mainly “economic.”

#### Vote negative to affirm that a world of living women and men exist. This debate is about how we position ourselves as students and educators. True politics is impossible inside the system of capitalism because it creates barriers and borders to systematically destroy the poor. The political imperative is to affirm unity.

Badiou, 2014 (Alain, Prof. @ European Graduate, “True Communism Is the Foreignness of Tomorrow: Alain Badiou talks in Athens”, Translated by David Broder, January 25, http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1547-true-communism-is-the-foreignness-of-tomorrow-alain-badiou-talks-in-athens)

I would like to thank, and to salute, all our Greek friends, and beyond that all those who are today struggling against the terrible situation inflicted on the Greek people by the financial oligarchy that today holds power in Europe, in service of globalised capitalism. The infamous Troika, which in reality runs the Greek government today, is not only the representative of Europe. Because Europe today is but a transmission belt for globalised capitalism. What are the Greek people told, in order to justify their oppression and devastation? That you have to take your place in the world as it really is. You have to take account of the realities of the contemporary world. You have to resign yourselves to obeying the laws of the market economy and global competition. In order to resist this propaganda, it is necessary to start out from one very simple proposition. Today, there is no real world constituted by the men and women who live on this planet. Why do I say that there is no world of men and women? Because the world that does exist, the world of globalisation, is only a world of commodities and financial exchange. It is exactly what Marx predicted a hundred and fifty years ago: the world of the world market. In this world, there are only things – sellable objects – and signs – the abstract instruments of buying and selling, the different forms of money and credit. Yet it is not true that in this world human subjects exist freely. And, for starters, they absolutely do not have the basic right to move around and settle down where they want. For the crushing majority of men and women in the so-called world, the world of commodities and money, have not the slightest access to this world. They are harshly walled off from it, existing outside of it, where there are very few commodities and no money at all. And I mean ‘walled off’ very concretely. Everywhere in the world, walls are being built. The wall that is intended to separate the Palestinians from the Israelis; the wall on the Mexican-US border; the electrified barrier between Africa and Spain; the mayor of one Italian town suggested building a wall between the centre and the suburbs! Always more walls, imprisoning the poor in their own homes. There are those in Europe who think we ought to build a wall between unlucky Greece and well-off Northern Europe. The pretend world of globalisation is a world of walls and imprisonment. Almost twenty years ago, the Berlin Wall fell. This symbolised the unity of the world after fifty years of separation. During these fifty years there were two worlds, the socialist world and the capitalist world. Or as some said, the totalitarian world and the democratic world. So, then, the fall of the Berlin Wall was the triumph of a single world, the world of democracy. Yet now we see that the wall merely shifted. It had stood between the totalitarian East and democratic West, but today stands between the rich capitalist North and the devastated, poor South. This is also the case even within Europe. In times past – also within individual countries, including the Northern ones – the contradiction used to oppose a powerful, organised working class to the ruling bourgeoisie that controlled the state. Today, we everywhere see only the ruling bourgeoisie that controls the state. Today, we everywhere see the rich beneficiaries of global trade and the enormous mass of the excluded, and between the two there are all sorts of walls and barriers; they no longer go to the same schools, they do not get the same healthcare, they cannot move around in the same way, they do not live in the same parts of the city… ‘Excluded’ is the right name for all those who are not in the real world, who are outside it, behind the wall and the barbed wire. Or here, in Greece, behind the wall of prejudice and behind Europe’s gendarmes. Thirty years ago there was an ideological wall, a political iron curtain. Today there is a wall that separates the jouissance of the rich from the desire of the poor. Everything works as if sharp separations have to be drawn among living bodies according to their provenance and resources, in order for the single world of monetary signs and objects to exist. Today, I repeat, there is no world. That is, because the cost of the unified world of capital is the brutal, violent division of human existence into two regions separated by walls, police dogs, bureaucratic controls, naval patrols, barbed wire and deportations. Why is it that so-called immigration has become a fundamentally important political question across the entire world? Because all the human beings who come, trying to live and work in different countries, are the proof that the democratic unity of the world is entirely false. If it were true, we would have to welcome these foreigners as people from the same world as ourselves. We would have to love them like you would someone on a journey who comes to a halt just outside your house. But that is not at all the case. The great mass of us think that these people come from another world. This is the problem. They are the living proof that our developed, democratic world is not the single world of men and women. There exist among us men and women who are considered to have come from another world. There are even people in Europe, like the Greeks, who the French or German government see as coming from another world. Money is the same everywhere, the dollar and the euro are the same thing everywhere; we happily accept the dollars or euros which these foreigners from another world have in their pockets. But in terms of their person, provenance, and way of life, they are not from our world. We place controls on them, we do not allow them to stay. We send a troika to watch over them. We anxiously ask ourselves how many of them there are in our midst, how many of these people have come from another world. A horrible question, if you think about it. A question that inevitably prepares the terrain for their persecution, banning and mass expulsion. A question that fuels the criminal side of government policies. So we can say this: If the unity of the world is the unity of monetary objects and signs, then for living bodies there is no such unity. There are zones, walls, desperate journeys, hatred, and deaths. There is good Germany and bad Greece. That is the reason why the central political question today is the world, the question of the existence of the world. The single world, against the false world of the global market: that is what the great communist Marx wanted, and it is to him that we must refer back. He energetically argued that the world is what is common to all humanity. He said that the principal actor in emancipation is the proletarian. Yes, he said: the proletarian has no fatherland other than the entire world of human beings. And for this to be realised, it would be necessary to finish with the world of the global market, the world of commodities and of money. The world of capital and property-owners. For there to be a world common to all, it would be necessary to finish with the financial dictatorship of private property. Today, some people – no doubt, full of good intentions – think that we could arrive at this powerful vision of Marx’s by expanding democracy. That is, by extending the good form of the world, namely what exists in the Western democracies and Japan, to the whole world. Greece, then, ought to be properly globalised, to be at peace with its banks and fully submissive to them. The problem is that this democracy doesn’t exist everywhere. In my view, this is an absurd take on things. The absolute material basis of the democratic Western world is private property. Its law is that one percent of people own 46% of the world’s wealth and that ten percent own 86% of the world’s wealth. And fifty percent of the world’s population – yes, that’s fifty percent – in reality own nothing at all. How can a world be made, with such raging inequalities? In the Western democracies, freedom is first and foremost the unlimited freedom of property, the appropriation of everything that has value. And then comes the freedom of circulation of monetary objects and signs. The fatal consequence of this conception of freedom is the separation of living bodies by and for the dogged, pitiless defence of the privileges of wealth. Moreover, we know perfectly well what concrete form this ‘expansion’ of democracy takes. It is, simply enough, war. The wars in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somali and Libya, not to mention the dozens of French military interventions in Africa. But it is also the silent, insidious war against entire peoples – like the Greeks - by the world and European system. The fact that it would be necessary to wage long wars in order to organise so-called free elections in a given country, ought to make us reflect not only on war but also on elections. What conception of the world is today linked to electoral democracy? As well as everything else, this democracy imposes the law of numbers. Just as it is through numbers that the world unified by commodities imposes the law of money. It may well be that the military imposition of the law of electoral numbers in Baghdad as in Tripoli, Belgrade, Bamako, Kabul or Bangui leads us to our problem: if the world is the world of objects and signs, it is a world where everything is counted. And those who do not count, or only a little, have our laws of counting imposed on them by war. Which proves that the world thus conceived does not exist in reality, or else only exists artificially, through violence. I believe that we must turn this problem on its head. We must affirm the existence of the world, from the outset, as an axiom and a principle. We must say this very simple phrase: ‘There is a world of living women and men’. This sentence is not an objective conclusion. We know that under the law of money, there is no single world of women and men. There is the wall separating the rich from the poor, the governors of Europe from the people of Greece. This phrase, ‘there is a world’, is performative. We decide that it exists for us

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The single world of living women and men could well have laws. It could not have conditions for entering it or existing within it. There can be no obligation to be like other people in order to live there. Still less to be like a minority of these others, for example to be like a civilised white petit-bourgeois or a Greek nationalist brute. If there is a single world, then all those who live within it exist like me, but they are not like me: they are different. The single world is precisely the place where the infinity of differences exists. The world is the same became the people living in this world are different. If, on the contrary, we demand that those who live in the world be the same, then it is the world that is closed off and itself becomes different to some other world. Which inevitably leads to separations, walls, controls, hatred, deaths, fascism and finally, war. So, people will ask: is there nothing to regulate these infinite differences? No identity that enters into a dialectic with these differences? A single world, fair enough, but does this really mean that to be French, or a Moroccan living in France, or a Breton, or a Muslim in a country with Christian traditions, or an Albanian in Greece, counts for nothing in the face of the imposing unity of the world of the living? It is a good question. Of course, the infinity of differences is also the infinity of identities. Let us examine a little how these distinct identities can persist even when we have affirmed the existence of a single world for all human beings. But first: what is an identity? The simplest definition is that an identity is the set of traits and properties by which an individual or group recognise ‘themselves’. But what is their ‘themselves’? It is constituted by all the properties characteristic of identity that remain unchanged. So we could say that an identity is a set of unvarying traits and properties. For example, homosexual identity is constituted by all that which concerns the invariance of the possible object of desire; an artist’s identity is what we can recognise as unchanging in her style; the identity of a foreign community within a given country is constituted by that in which it recognises its own belonging: language, rituals, clothing, convictions, eating habits, etc. Thus defined by invariance, identity relates to difference in two ways. Identity is that which is different from everything else (static identity). Identity is that which does not become different (dynamic identity). In the background, we have the great philosophical dynamic of the Self and of the Other. Taking the hypothesis that we all live in the same world, we can affirm the right to be the same, to maintain and develop one’s identity. If the Malian labourer or the Albanian street-sweeper exists like me, he can also say that he has the right, just like me, to maintain and organise the invariant properties which are his own, from his religion to his mother tongue, entertainment, way of life, etc. He affirms his identity in refusing that which integration would impose upon him: meaning, the pure and simple dissolution of his identity in favour of another. Since if he thinks like I do, that he lives in the same world as me, he has no reason to consider this other identity a priori better than his own. That said, this affirmation of identity has two rather different aspects, within the dialectic of the Self and the Other. The first aspect is the desire that I will become my future self within the bounds of sameness. A little like what Nietzsche said in his famous maxim: ‘Become what you are’. This means the immanent development of identity within a new situation. The Malian labourer or Albanian street-sweeper will not at all abandon what makes up his individual, family or collective identity. But he will little by little appropriate, in a creative matter, everything to be found in the corner of the world where he ends up. He will thus invent what he is: a Malian worker in the Paris suburbs, or an Albanian street-sweeper – or even an Albanian beggar – in some district of Athens. He will create himself through a subjective movement, from the Malian peasant to the worker settling down in Paris, or from the unfortunate Albanian mountain-dweller to the Athens street-sweeper or beggar. With no internal fracture, but through an expansion of his identity. The other way of affirming one’s identity is negative. It consists of doggedly insisting that I am not the Other. And it is always indispensable when our governments – all reactionaries and the accomplices of fascism, on this point – demand an authoritarian, persecutory integration. The Malian labourer, then, forcefully asserts that his traditions and customs are not those of the European petit-bourgeois. The identitarian traits expressed in his religion and clothing might even be reinforced. He opposes himself to the Western world, whose supposed superiority he does not accept. And how can he be reproached for this, if we think, rightly enough, that the idea of one world being superior is absurd, since there is just one world? Finally, within identity there are two distinct meanings of difference. An affirmative one: the Self maintains itself through its own power to differentiate. It is a creation. A negative usage: the Self defends itself against its corruption by the Other. It wants to preserve its purity. It is a purification. Every identity is the dialectical play of a movement of creation and a movement of purification. We see well enough, then, the relation between identities and the great principle that ‘There is just one world’. The general idea is a simple one: given the principle of the unity of the world of the living, identities everywhere make creation prevail over purification. Why is the politics of walls, persecutions, controls and expulsions a disaster? Why does it create a very dangerous mood tending toward fascism? Because, of course, it in fact creates two worlds, which implies denying the very existence of humanity and leads to endless wars. But moreover, it corrupts our societies internally as well. Because the Moroccans, Malians, Romanians, Albanians and all the others will in any case come in great numbers. However, persecution reinforces among their ranks not the process of creation, but rather the process of purification. In the face of Sarkozy and Blair, Hollande and Valls, Venizelos and all the others who want immediate integration by means of expulsion and persecution, we have young Islamists ready to martyr themselves for the purity of their faith. And if the Front National or Golden Dawn organise attacks or pogroms, then it will little by little transform our societies into purely repressive, police-state regimes. That prepares the terrain for fascism, which is nothing other than capitalist politics enslaved to some inflated national fantasy by way of police repression. That is why we must support at any price everything that makes creative identity win out over purifying identity, albeit in the knowledge that the latter can never disappear completely. The only means of doing so is to assert from the outset that there is just one world. And that the consequences flowing from this axiom must be political actions that open up the creative aspect of identities: such that I can very precisely discuss with a Moroccan worker or a mother from Mali, as with an unemployed Albanian, what we can do together to assert that we all exist in the same world, whatever our partially distinct identities. Everywhere, we must organise the political existence of a single world. We will meet other, and we will be able to discuss as equals our different ways of being in the same world. But at the outset, before anything else, we will all together demand the abolition of persecutory laws, laws that set up walls and organise raids and deportations. Laws that hand foreigners over to the police. We will assert forcefully, as in a battle, that the presence in our countries of hundreds of thousands of people who have come from abroad is not at all a question of identity and integration. Central, here, are proletarians, who ultimately teach us through their active, nomadic lives that in politics – in communist politics – it is necessary to take the single world of living human beings as one’s point of reference, and not the false world of separate nations. To see all this, it is enough to understand the simple idea that they are here and exist like us. It is enough to note their existence and give it regular status, considered as a normal life, a life that is allowed to exist like any other. Essentially, it is enough to do what anyone would naturally do with regard to their friends. In this collective journey, we will exchange our identities, without anyone having to renounce who they are, or integrating anyone into what someone else is. Foreigners will teach us how, after their long journey, they view the very bad politics of our country and how they will participate in changing it; and we will teach the foreigners how we have long tried to change it, this politics, and the essential role we see them as having in the future of this struggle. New ideas will emerge from this process, in unpredictable ways. And also new forms of organisation, where the difference between foreigners and the native-born will be entirely subordinated to our common vision: there is a single world where we all exist equally, and in this world our identities can have an amicable exchange since we share in common political action. We can thus recapitulate our line of thinking in four points: The ‘world’ of untrammelled capitalism and the rich democracies is a false world. Recognising the unity only of monetary products and signs, it rejects the majority of humanity, pushed out into another, devalued ‘world’, from which it separates itself through walls and warfare. In this sense, there is today no world. There are but walls, drownings, hatred, wars, pillaged and abandoned areas, areas that are protected from everything else, others left in total poverty, and the criminal ideologies that prosper on the back of all this chaos. Thus to assert that ‘there is a single world’ is a principle for action, a political imperative. This principle also entails the equality of existence in each and every part of this single world. The principle that there is a single world does not contradict the infinite play of identities and differences. It entails only that identities subordinate their negative dimension (their opposition to the Other) to their affirmative dimension (the development of the Self). As concerns the existence of millions of foreigners in our countries, we have three objectives: to oppose persecutory integration; to block the road to reactive purification; and to develop creative identities. The concrete articulation of these three objectives defines that which is most important in politics today. And on this intimate link between politics and the question of foreigners, which is today absolutely central, we can look to an astonishing text by Plato, with which I would like to conclude. It is at the end of book 9 of his Republic. Socrates’s young interlocutors say: ‘What you tell us about politics is all well and good, but it is impossible. You cannot put it into practice’. And Socrates replies: ‘Yes, in the city where we are born it is perhaps impossible. But perhaps it will be possible in another city’. As if every true politics presupposed expatriation, exile, foreignness. Let us remember this when we go amicably to do politics with foreign students and workers, young people in the suburbs and the poor of all backgrounds and beliefs: Socrates was right, the fact that they are foreign, or that their culture is different, is not an obstacle. On the contrary! It is an opportunity, the possibility of creating new forms of internationalism right here and now. And remember what Marx said: the most fundamental characteristic of the communist, is to be an internationalist. Because the realisation of a true politics in any one part of this single world we now proclaim absolutely needs – to be even possible – those who come from somewhere else in this same world. A French Socialist Prime minister said at the beginning of the 1980s that ‘immigrants are a problem’. We must turn this on its head: ‘immigrants are an opportunity!’ The mass of foreign workers and their children bear witness - in our old, tired countries – to the youth of the world, its extent, its infinite variety. It is with them that the politics of the future will be created. Without them, we will remain stuck in nihilist consumerism and police order. We will allow ourselves to be dominated by little LePen-ists and their cops. Foreigners must at least teach us to become foreigners to ourselves, to project ourselves outside of ourselves and no longer remain captive in this long, white Western history which is now coming to an end, and from which there is nothing more to expect but sterility and war. As against waiting for this nihilist and securitarian catastrophe, we salute the true communism, which is the novelty, and thus the foreignness, of tomorrow.

## 2NC

### Performative Resistance Link

#### The 1AC’s performance cannot escape the systematic reach of corporate capitalism – ensures that it is drained of its progressive potential and furthers marginalization

Ide 13 (Derek, studied history and education at the University of Toledo, “How Capitalism Underdeveloped Hip Hop: A People's History of Political Rap (Part 1 of 2),” June 4, <http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/capitalismhiphoppartone.html#.UzgNbijc_X4>)

Hip-hop's glamorized, commercialized image, made familiar through every aspect of pop culture and privately centralized radio stations, is viewed by some as a justification for the prevailing "boot strap" ideology derived from thirty years of neoliberal economic policies and the dominant ideological formulations supporting them. Time argues capitalism allowed for "rap music's market strength [to give] its artists permission to say what they pleased." [4] Indeed, some argue that one's ability to market a product in a capitalist society is what has allowed rap music to flourish and become as large of an industry as it is today.[5] This simplistic view, however, ignores one crucial aspect; the culture has been manipulated by a handful of industry executives for capital gain. Meanwhile, hip-hop activists who advocate for social change, formulate political dissent, and fight for economic redistribution have been systematically marginalized and excluded from the mainstream discourse. Corporate capitalism, aided by neoliberal deregulation and privatization, have stolen the culture, sterilized its content, and reformatted its image to reflect the dominant ideology. Independent, political rap containing valuable social commentary has been replaced with shallow, corporate images of thugs, drugs, and racial and gender prejudices filled with both implicitly and explicitly hegemonic undertones and socially constructed stereotypes. Hip-hop has been underdeveloped by the mainstream industry in the same sense that third world countries were underdeveloped by traditionally oppressive first world nations: it has been robbed of its content like a nation is robbed of its resources, its artists exploited like a country's labor is exploited, and its very survival hinged upon complete subservience to an established political, economic, and social institution. The following is an outline of a culture's musical resistance to subjugation by the economic, political, and social authority of American capitalism and its ruling elites.

### Alt

#### Now this is not to say that we have to efface difference – First – that is the status quo – We accept the foreigners dollars but we do not accept the foreigners body – the alternative would challenge that – Second – this solves the aff

Badiou, 2014 (Alain, Prof. @ European Graduate, “True Communism Is the Foreignness of Tomorrow: Alain Badiou talks in Athens”, Translated by David Broder, January 25, http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1547-true-communism-is-the-foreignness-of-tomorrow-alain-badiou-talks-in-athens)

. And that we will remain faithful to this phrase. The task at hand is to draw the very serious and difficult consequences flowing from this very simple sentence. Just as Marx, when he created the first international organisation of the working class, drew the difficult consequences of his statement that the workers have no fatherland. The proletarians are from all countries. The proletarians are international. One very simple, first consequence concerns the people of foreign origin who live among us: those who are called immigrants. In my country, that means Moroccans, Malians, Chinese people and many others. Here, too, amidst the general poverty, there are also people who have come from elsewhere, for instance Albanians. If there is a single world of living women and men, then they are from the same world as us. This black African worker I see in a restaurant kitchen, or the Moroccan I see digging a hole in the road, or the veiled woman I see looking after the kids in a nursery; all of them are from the same world as me. That is the capital point. It is there, and nowhere else, that we can overturn the dominant idea of the unification of the world by way of objects, signs and elections – an idea that leads to war and persecution. The unity of the world is the unity of living, active bodies in the here and now. And I absolutely must pass the real test of this unity: that these people who are here – different from me in their language, clothes, religion, food, and education – do exist in the same world, and quite simply exist like I do. Because they exist like me, I can discuss with them, and then, just like anyone else, have our agreements and disagreements. But on the absolute condition that they exist exactly as I do, meaning, in the same world. 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No identity that enters into a dialectic with these differences? A single world, fair enough, but does this really mean that to be French, or a Moroccan living in France, or a Breton, or a Muslim in a country with Christian traditions, or an Albanian in Greece, counts for nothing in the face of the imposing unity of the world of the living? It is a good question. Of course, the infinity of differences is also the infinity of identities. Let us examine a little how these distinct identities can persist even when we have affirmed the existence of a single world for all human beings. But first: what is an identity? The simplest definition is that an identity is the set of traits and properties by which an individual or group recognise ‘themselves’. But what is their ‘themselves’? It is constituted by all the properties characteristic of identity that remain unchanged. So we could say that an identity is a set of unvarying traits and properties. For example, homosexual identity is constituted by all that which concerns the invariance of the possible object of desire; an artist’s identity is what we can recognise as unchanging in her style; the identity of a foreign community within a given country is constituted by that in which it recognises its own belonging: language, rituals, clothing, convictions, eating habits, etc. Thus defined by invariance, identity relates to difference in two ways. Identity is that which is different from everything else (static identity). Identity is that which does not become different (dynamic identity). In the background, we have the great philosophical dynamic of the Self and of the Other. Taking the hypothesis that we all live in the same world, we can affirm the right to be the same, to maintain and develop one’s identity. If the Malian labourer or the Albanian street-sweeper exists like me, he can also say that he has the right, just like me, to maintain and organise the invariant properties which are his own, from his religion to his mother tongue, entertainment, way of life, etc. He affirms his identity in refusing that which integration would impose upon him: meaning, the pure and simple dissolution of his identity in favour of another. Since if he thinks like I do, that he lives in the same world as me, he has no reason to consider this other identity a priori better than his own. That said, this affirmation of identity has two rather different aspects, within the dialectic of the Self and the Other. The first aspect is the desire that I will become my future self within the bounds of sameness. A little like what Nietzsche said in his famous maxim: ‘Become what you are’. This means the immanent development of identity within a new situation. The Malian labourer or Albanian street-sweeper will not at all abandon what makes up his individual, family or collective identity. But he will little by little appropriate, in a creative matter, everything to be found in the corner of the world where he ends up. He will thus invent what he is: a Malian worker in the Paris suburbs, or an Albanian street-sweeper – or even an Albanian beggar – in some district of Athens. He will create himself through a subjective movement, from the Malian peasant to the worker settling down in Paris, or from the unfortunate Albanian mountain-dweller to the Athens street-sweeper or beggar. With no internal fracture, but through an expansion of his identity. The other way of affirming one’s identity is negative. It consists of doggedly insisting that I am not the Other. And it is always indispensable when our governments – all reactionaries and the accomplices of fascism, on this point – demand an authoritarian, persecutory integration. The Malian labourer, then, forcefully asserts that his traditions and customs are not those of the European petit-bourgeois. The identitarian traits expressed in his religion and clothing might even be reinforced. He opposes himself to the Western world, whose supposed superiority he does not accept. And how can he be reproached for this, if we think, rightly enough, that the idea of one world being superior is absurd, since there is just one world? Finally, within identity there are two distinct meanings of difference. An affirmative one: the Self maintains itself through its own power to differentiate. It is a creation. A negative usage: the Self defends itself against its corruption by the Other. It wants to preserve its purity. It is a purification. Every identity is the dialectical play of a movement of creation and a movement of purification. We see well enough, then, the relation between identities and the great principle that ‘There is just one world’. The general idea is a simple one: given the principle of the unity of the world of the living, identities everywhere make creation prevail over purification. Why is the politics of walls, persecutions, controls and expulsions a disaster? Why does it create a very dangerous mood tending toward fascism? Because, of course, it in fact creates two worlds, which implies denying the very existence of humanity and leads to endless wars. But moreover, it corrupts our societies internally as well. Because the Moroccans, Malians, Romanians, Albanians and all the others will in any case come in great numbers. However, persecution reinforces among their ranks not the process of creation, but rather the process of purification. In the face of Sarkozy and Blair, Hollande and Valls, Venizelos and all the others who want immediate integration by means of expulsion and persecution, we have young Islamists ready to martyr themselves for the purity of their faith. And if the Front National or Golden Dawn organise attacks or pogroms, then it will little by little transform our societies into purely repressive, police-state regimes. That prepares the terrain for fascism, which is nothing other than capitalist politics enslaved to some inflated national fantasy by way of police repression. That is why we must support at any price everything that makes creative identity win out over purifying identity, albeit in the knowledge that the latter can never disappear completely. The only means of doing so is to assert from the outset that there is just one world. And that the consequences flowing from this axiom must be political actions that open up the creative aspect of identities: such that I can very precisely discuss with a Moroccan worker or a mother from Mali, as with an unemployed Albanian, what we can do together to assert that we all exist in the same world, whatever our partially distinct identities. Everywhere, we must organise the political existence of a single world. We will meet other, and we will be able to discuss as equals our different ways of being in the same world. But at the outset, before anything else, we will all together demand the abolition of persecutory laws, laws that set up walls and organise raids and deportations. Laws that hand foreigners over to the police. We will assert forcefully, as in a battle, that the presence in our countries of hundreds of thousands of people who have come from abroad is not at all a question of identity and integration. Central, here, are proletarians, who ultimately teach us through their active, nomadic lives that in politics – in communist politics – it is necessary to take the single world of living human beings as one’s point of reference, and not the false world of separate nations. To see all this, it is enough to understand the simple idea that they are here and exist like us. It is enough to note their existence and give it regular status, considered as a normal life, a life that is allowed to exist like any other. Essentially, it is enough to do what anyone would naturally do with regard to their friends. In this collective journey, we will exchange our identities, without anyone having to renounce who they are, or integrating anyone into what someone else is. Foreigners will teach us how, after their long journey, they view the very bad politics of our country and how they will participate in changing it; and we will teach the foreigners how we have long tried to change it, this politics, and the essential role we see them as having in the future of this struggle. New ideas will emerge from this process, in unpredictable ways. And also new forms of organisation, where the difference between foreigners and the native-born will be entirely subordinated to our common vision: there is a single world where we all exist equally, and in this world our identities can have an amicable exchange since we share in common political action. We can thus recapitulate our line of thinking in four points: The ‘world’ of untrammelled capitalism and the rich democracies is a false world. Recognising the unity only of monetary products and signs, it rejects the majority of humanity, pushed out into another, devalued ‘world’, from which it separates itself through walls and warfare. In this sense, there is today no world. There are but walls, drownings, hatred, wars, pillaged and abandoned areas, areas that are protected from everything else, others left in total poverty, and the criminal ideologies that prosper on the back of all this chaos. Thus to assert that ‘there is a single world’ is a principle for action, a political imperative. This principle also entails the equality of existence in each and every part of this single world. The principle that there is a single world does not contradict the infinite play of identities and differences. It entails only that identities subordinate their negative dimension (their opposition to the Other) to their affirmative dimension (the development of the Self). As concerns the existence of millions of foreigners in our countries, we have three objectives: to oppose persecutory integration; to block the road to reactive purification; and to develop creative identities. The concrete articulation of these three objectives defines that which is most important in politics today. And on this intimate link between politics and the question of foreigners, which is today absolutely central, we can look to an astonishing text by Plato, with which I would like to conclude. It is at the end of book 9 of his Republic. Socrates’s young interlocutors say: ‘What you tell us about politics is all well and good, but it is impossible. You cannot put it into practice’. And Socrates replies: ‘Yes, in the city where we are born it is perhaps impossible. But perhaps it will be possible in another city’. As if every true politics presupposed expatriation, exile, foreignness. Let us remember this when we go amicably to do politics with foreign students and workers, young people in the suburbs and the poor of all backgrounds and beliefs: Socrates was right, the fact that they are foreign, or that their culture is different, is not an obstacle. On the contrary! It is an opportunity, the possibility of creating new forms of internationalism right here and now. And remember what Marx said: the most fundamental characteristic of the communist, is to be an internationalist. Because the realisation of a true politics in any one part of this single world we now proclaim absolutely needs – to be even possible – those who come from somewhere else in this same world. A French Socialist Prime minister said at the beginning of the 1980s that ‘immigrants are a problem’. We must turn this on its head: ‘immigrants are an opportunity!’ The mass of foreign workers and their children bear witness - in our old, tired countries – to the youth of the world, its extent, its infinite variety. It is with them that the politics of the future will be created. Without them, we will remain stuck in nihilist consumerism and police order. We will allow ourselves to be dominated by little LePen-ists and their cops. Foreigners must at least teach us to become foreigners to ourselves, to project ourselves outside of ourselves and no longer remain captive in this long, white Western history which is now coming to an end, and from which there is nothing more to expect but sterility and war. As against waiting for this nihilist and securitarian catastrophe, we salute the true communism, which is the novelty, and thus the foreignness, of tomorrow.

### Hip Hop Link

#### Hip hop just gets absorbed and co-opted – speed at which mainstreamed prevents ability to fracture the dominant norm

Vincent Williams 2000 “IT TAKES A NATION OF MILLIONS TO INVENT RAP”, <http://www2.citypaper.com/music/story.asp?id=8339>

But something amazing happened when no one was looking, or when everyone was looking in the wrong place: As the art grew and expanded beyond the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and black radio, hip-hop lost control and ownership of itself.¶ For the extent of its short history, a great deal of the power and resonance of hip-hop came from the fact that it was an outsider art form. Because it came from the ghetto, because it didn't reveal an overt mainstream musical connection, because it was culturally specific, something as innocuous as, say, "Rapper's Delight" was revolutionary. Because hip-hop came from the bottom up, outside the usual channels of media and music-industry control, it was intrinsically rebellious. The fact that it drew the imagination and attention of suburban youth to a world their parents probably preferred to pretend didn't exist made it dangerous.¶ Because of this situation, in spite of any organized resistance, mainstream America absorbed and co-opted hip-hop as if it was just another facet of American life. Almost overnight, Fred Flintstone was rapping about Coco Pebbles with Barney break dancing in the background. Backward baseball caps and baggy jeans became as common as khaki pants. Fashion designers started incorporating trunk jewelry into their collections. Eazy-E was invited to a function at the White House. The days of hip-hop as an "outsider" art form were over.¶ Through some sort of weird symbiosis, some of the most imaginative hip-hop ever created came about during this period, almost as a direct response to the art's "mainstreaming." Once the sociopolitical weight was pulled away and commercial forces came to bear, the purely artistic aspects of hip-hop got a shot in the arm. Groups such as De La Soul, the Beastie Boys, A Tribe Called Quest, Brand Nubian, and Gang Starr (not to mention non-'banger West Coasters such as the Freestyle Fellowship, the Pharcyde, and the various Hieroglyphics crews) experimented with live instrumentation, exotic sonic textures, and new lyrical concerns. These groups and others trailblazed ahead, expanding what "hip-hop" meant and could mean, just as mainstream media outlets such as People magazine thought they had gotten it down.¶ But the rise of West Coast hip-hop heightened an unpredictable force on the music's future: regionalism. Ever since MC Shan's 1986 track "The Bridge" and its answer record, KRS-One's "The Bridge Is Over," representing one's home ground has been an integral part of the genre. But the West Coast folks' pride in their success and the East Coast performers' jealousy over the West Coast gains combined to create an environment that would prove deadly.¶ This contentious atmosphere also served as the perfect launching pad for—love him or hate him—one of the most influential players in the short history of hip-hop, Sean "Puffy" Combs and his Bad Boy empire.¶ Shrewd businessman that he is, the New York-based Combs engaged in a bicoastal philosophical tennis match with the West Coast. While the Californians offered death and mayhem, Combs lobbed back fun and extravagance. Instead of drive-bys, he celebrated nice cars. They flashed gang signs; Combs flashed blinding jewelry. The West Coast brandished mindless violence. Bad Boy responded with mindless hedonism.¶ But all of Combs' plans and schemes wouldn't have worked without Christopher "The Notorious B.I.G." Wallace. Yeah, the hip-hop world was prepped for party music, but Biggie's distinctive flow and personality filled out Combs' philosophy and made it real. Biggie's storytelling ability was topnotch and, soon, Puffy's playa fantasy was synonymous with Biggie's reality. Puffy was the mind behind Bad Boy but Biggie was the face of the company, a role that would have unfortunate consequences.¶ We all know how this ended. Posturing. Threats. Animosity. Before long, Tupac Shakur, then signed to West Coast-based Death Row Records, was shot dead. Months later, so was Wallace. The words and the feuding fronts had become reality. The lines between fantasy and reality fatally blurred and the hip-hop world had its first set of martyrs. I don't think the culture has yet recovered.¶ But almost 30 years after Kool Herc first combined two turntables and a microphone, hip-hop is firmly in place. It has morphed into a multifaceted form accommodating many sounds and, in true B-boy fashion, has flipped the script on America's attempts to absorb it. Instead of the mainstream world integrating hip-hop and diluting the music, hip-hop has, in many ways, absorbed the mainstream and changed it.¶ The days when only New Yorkers, or even just Americans, created the music are long gone. You've got rap music coming out of Atlanta, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Detroit. You've got French MCs, Japanese DJs, and British crews.¶ Musically, the form's influence is everywhere. Hip-hop revitalized R&B. Drum 'n' bass, ambient, trip-hop, take your pick—all of them would be vastly different art forms or, perhaps, wouldn't even exist if it wasn't for hip-hop. Hell, nowadays rock music more often than not pumps a breakbeat that is more Run-D.M.C. than anything else. If you pull back the curtain on Britney Spears, the Backstreet Boys, and their ilk, you'll find, more often than not, the old-school rap/R&B stars of Full Force pulling the musical strings. Once you factor in the teenybopper music, most of the past year's Billboard Top 10 has been touched by hip-hop.¶ Once you leave the field of music, the influence of the culture reaches even further. Hip-hop still sells soda, burgers, clothes, cars, candy, toys—you name it. But gone are the days when ads featured a Smurf rapping or some such foolishness. In another case of novelty wearing off and true influence growing, ad agencies sign actual hip-hop personalities to push products. You've got Black Star doing Levi's ads and LL Cool J pushing the Gap (while, in a show of classic hip-hop rebellion, quickly dropping a good word or two about hip-hop clothier FUBU).¶ And it goes beyond mere merchandising. Will Smith is a bona fide superstar who rose out of the rap world. Aaron McGruder has a daily hip-hop comic on the same newspaper page as Cathy and Blondie. Lauryn Hill created the first hip-hop album that three generations owned. Broadway productions Rent and Bring In Da Noise Bring In Da Funk both worked on hip-hop cadences. The mugs of rap moguls Combs, Russell Simmons, and Master P could be seen on the cover of all the financial mags—success is success no matter how it is attained¶ Of course, hip-hop's merger with the mainstream has stripped the music of some of its outsider protest power. But if hip-hop had remained the Other—a musical novelty— any cultural authority it might have once carried would have been eventually undercut anyway.

### Perm

#### The permutation makes neoliberal structures just another marker which prevents a universal break from the system

Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, 2000, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, p. 95-97

Let me, then, take a closer look at Laclau’s narrative which runs from Marxist essentialism the proletariat as the universal (lass whose revolu­tionary mission is inscribed into its very social being and thus discernible via ‘objective’ scientific analysis) to the ‘postmodern’ recognition of the contingent, tropological, metaphorico-metonymic, link between a social agent and its ‘task’. Once this contingency is acknowledged, one has to accept that there is no direct, ‘natural’ correlation between an agent’s social position and its tasks in the political struggle, no norm of devel­opment by which to measure exceptions say because of the weak political subjectivity of the bourgeoisie in Russia around 1900, the work­ing class had to accomplish the bourgeois-democratic revolution itself. My first observation here is that while this standard post— modern Leftist narrative of the passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism with the proletariat as the unique Historical Subject, the privileging of economic class struggle, and so on, to the postmodern irreducible plu­rality of struggles undoubtedly describes an actual historical process, its proponents, as a rule, lease out the resignation at its heart the accept­ance of capitalism as ‘the only game in town’, the renunciation of any real attempt to overcome the existing capitalist liberal regime. This point was already made very precisely in Wendy Brown’s perspicuous observation that ‘the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain renaturalization of capitalism’. The crucial question to be asked is thus: to what extent a critique of capitalism is foreclosed by the current con­figuration of oppositional politics, and not simply by the ‘loss of the socialist alternative’ or the ostensible ~triumph of liberalism’ in the global order. In contrast with the Marxist critique of a social whole and Marxist vision of total transformation, to what extent do identity politics require a standard internal to existing society against which to pitch their claims, a standard that not only preserves capitalism from critique, but sustains the invisibility and inarticulateness of class — not incidentally, but endem­ically? Could we have stumbled upon one reason why class is invariably named but rarely theorized or developed in the multiculturalist mantra, ‘race, class, gender, sexuality’?1 One can describe in very precise terms this reduction of class to an entity ‘named but rarely theorized’: one of the great and permanent results of the so-called ‘Western Marxism’ first formulated by the young Lukics is that the class-and-commodity structure of capitalism is not just a phenomenon limited to the particular ‘domain’ of economy, but the structuring principle that overdetermines the social totality, from politics to art and religion. This global dimension of capitalism is sus­pended in today’s multiculturalist progressive politics: its ‘anti-capitalism’ is reduced to the level of how today’s capitalism breeds sexist/racist oppression, and so on. Marx claimed that in the series production—distribution —exchange—consumption, the term ‘production’ is doubly inscribed: it is simultaneously one of the terms in the series and the structuring principle of the entire series. In production as one of the terms of the series, production (as the structuring principle) ‘encounters itself in its oppositional determination’,’2 as Marx put it, using the pre­cise Hegelian term. And the same goes for the postmodern political series class—gender—race…: in class as one of the terms in the series of particular struggles, class qua structuring principle of the social totality encounters itself in its oppositional determination’.3 In so far as post­modern politics promotes, in effect, a kind of ‘politicization of the economy’, is not this politicization similar to the way our supermarkets which fundamentally exclude from their field of visibility the actual production process (the way vegetables and fruit are harvested and packed by immigrant workers, the genetic and other manipulations in their production and display, etc.) — stage within the field of the dis­played goods, as a kind of ersatz, the spectacle of a pseudo-production (meals prepared in full view in ‘food courts’, fruit juices freshly squeezed before the customers’ eyes, etc.)?’5 An authentic Leftist should therefore ask the postmodern politicians the new version of the old Freudian question put to the perplexed Jew: ‘Why are von saving that one should politicize the economy, when one should in fact politicize the economy?’ So: in so far as postmodern politics involves a ‘[t]heoretical retreat from the problem of domination within capitalism’, it is here. in this silent suspension of class analysis, that we are dealing with an exemplary case of the mechanism of ideological displacement: when class antagonism is disavowed, when its key structuring role is suspended. ‘other markers of social difference may come to hear an inordinate weight; indeed, they may hear all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that attributable to the explicitly politicized marking”7. In other words, this displacement accounts for the somewhat ’excessive’ way the discourse of postmodern identity politics insists on the horrors of sexism, racism, and so on -- this ‘excess’ comes from the fact that these other ‘-isms’ have to hear the surplus-investment from the class struggle whose extent is not acknowledged.’8

#### Survival Strategies Link

Giroux, 2003 (Henry, Waterbury Chair Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at Pennsylvania State University, “Spectacles of Race and Pedagogies of Denial: Anti-Black Racist Pedagogy Under the Reign of Neoliberalism”, Communication Education, Vol. 52, No. 3/4, July/October)

Neoliberalism devitalizes democracy because it has no language for defending a politics in which citizenship becomes an investment in public life rather than an obligation to consume, relegated in this instance to an utterly privatized affair. The discourse of neoliberal racism has no way of talking about collective responsibility, social agency, or a defense of the public good. But the absences in its discourse are not innocent because they both ignore and perpetuate the stereotypes, structured violence, and massive inequalities produced by the racial state, the race-based attack on welfare, the destruction of social goods such as schools and health care, and the rise of the prison-industrial complex. And its attack on the principles of equality, liberty, economic democracy, and racial justice, in the final analysis, represents “a heartless indifference to the social contract, or any other civic minded concern for the larger social good” (Aziz, 2002, p. 6). Hence, it is not surprising how neoliberal arguments embracing the primacy of individual solutions to public issues such as poverty or the ongoing incarceration of Black males are quick to defend public policies that are both punitive and overtly racist such as workfare for welfare recipients or the public shaming rituals of prison chain gangs, with an overabundance of Black males always on display. Neoliberal racism’s “heartless indifference” to the plight of the poor and to human suffering in general is often mirrored in an utter disdain for human suffering, as in Shelby Steele’s nostalgic longing for a form of Social Darwinism in which “failure and suffering are natural and necessary elements of success” (cited in Klinker, 1998, p. 37).

## 1NR

### FW Solves – Movements

#### **The rejection of state institutions and education is akin to the policy of racial exclusion as seen previoiusly – must gain the legal education in order to combat these policys**

Woodson ’33 [1933, Carter G. Woodson is an African American historian and educator; he is the founder and editor of the Journal of Negro History and the Negro History Bulletin and the founder of the association for the study of Negro life and history. “The Miseducation of the Negro,” p83-84]

#### Not long ago a measure was introduced in a certain State Legislature to have the Constitution of the United States thus printed in school histories, but when the bill was about to pass it was killed by someone who made the point that it would never do to have Negroes study the Constitution of the United States. If the Negroes were granted the opportunity to peruse this document, they might learn to contend for the rights therein guaranteed; and no Negro teacher who gives attention to such matters of the government is tolerated in those backward districts. The teaching of government or the lack of such instruction, then, must be made to conform to the policy of “keeping the Negro in his place.”

#### By investigating paths of government action, debate teaches us to be organizationally relevant – trains us to challenge dominant institutions from within

Algoso 11 – writes on international development, aid, politics, management, complexity

(May 31, Dave, “Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter” <http://findwhatworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/>)

Because organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest — whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. **A well-run organization makes better decisions** about staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, **the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical**. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. **But if you don’t learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions**. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.

### AT: Objectivity

**Policy Edu indicated that objectivity wont occur – simulations will allow you to know what going on without falling victim,**

Keller, Whittaker, and Burke, 2001. [Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer, EBSCOhost]

#### Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key element in social work education. However, few social work students enroll in political or policy oriented practica. In a survey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that less than half offered practica in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/development (BSW=lS%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the largest representation at a single school being 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). Because few students receive policy-related field education, introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises in the classroom assumes greater importance. Bonwell and Eison (1991) describe the general characteristics of active learning in the classroom: \* Students are involved in more than listening. \* Less emphasis is placed on transmitting information and more on developing students’ skills \* Students *are* involved in higher-order thinking (analysis, synthesis, evaluation). \* Students are engaged in activities. \* Greater emphasis is placed on students’ exploration of their own attitudes and values. (p. 2) Experiential learning in the classroom may involve case studies, role plays, debates, simulations, or other activities that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge, and experience (Lewis & Williams, 1994). These active learning strategies encourage students to think on their feet, to question their own values and responses to situations, and to consider new ways of thinking in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember longer (Meyers & Jones, 1993).

## AT: Blackness k2 Movements -- PTX Edu Solves

#### Turn: The Affirmative’s Promise of Total Inclusion Will Result in Direct Exclusions

Asen 2002 (Robert Asen Asst Prof Communication, U. Wisconsin, 2002 “Imagining in the Public Sphere” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 2002, Vol. 34 Issue 4) Ebsco

Attention to imagining reveals that including more and more voices in multiple public spheres—a form of direct inclusion—is an indispensable but by itself insufficient reformulation of critical models of the public sphere. As with other discursive norms and practices, imagining may inform interactions even in ostensibly accessible forums. The consequences of collective imagining appear in the doubly disabling tendencies of representation that absent some people from public discourse and yet present them through disabling images. Counterpublic agents encounter these negative images as they enter previously foreclosed forums. Yet **disabling** **tendencies of representation should not prompt a scholarly flight from imagining** and its representational power. **A flight of this sort would return public sphere scholarship to a reconstructed bourgeois public sphere as a singular public forum in which everyone—at least in principle—is free to participate.** Existing **scholarship has demonstrated that such a sphere would most likely betray its legitimating discourses at the level of direct exclusions. A flight from representation also would require a renunciation of political legitimacy, identity formation, cultural diversity, and needs interpretation as appropriate topics of public discourse, for these are social goods.** More hopefully, representation ought not to be disavowed because imagining need not be disabling. Counterpublics may interact with wider publics to construct affirmative images of themselves and others that may engender discourses capable of advancing the multiple aims of discourse in the public sphere. Scholars may contribute to this process by elucidating how various forums may exclude potential participants in voice, body, and imagination.